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In this thesis, I introduce a two-country overlapping generation model to 
clarify the impact of foreign technology adoption, which is more productive, 
on economic development. The presence of foreign technology gives rise to 
poverty trap. Adoption takes place only when either the adaptability to for-
eign technology or domestic capital is sufficiently high. But unlike standard 
literature, poor countries are trapped in a low development level because 
some of their firms adopt foreign technology in steady state. Growth of cap-
ital can not transfer to growth of wage and hence income converges to a 
level worse than the autarky. Poor countries can escape from poverty trap 
if 1) domestic firm is highly adaptive to foreign technology or 2) domestic 
productivity is comparable to foreign productivity. Finally I extend to pro-
duction globalization model, where there is a continuum of foreign countries 
and technologies. The model predicts an income distribution featured by 
converging rich and diverging poor. At steady state the development level of 
poor countries depends on their productivity and adaptability. The border 
line between rich and poor depends on the highest productivity available, 
and the adaptability to such technology. 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Yip Chong 
Kee, to whom I am heavily indebted. He has been exceptionally patient and respon-
sible in the supervision. There has been a time that "dropping by" his office became 
a daily experience. Prof Yip is not a dictator-style supervisor and always so tolerant 
to let many rough ideas to grow. The idea presented here can not develop into this 
thesis without his advice and creative destruction. Needless to say, the remaining 
errors are all mine. 
I am grateful to Prof. Meng Qinglai and Prof. Du Julan for their valuable 
comments and time devoted to this thesis. 
I also owe my thank to my fellow classmates. During these two years, we have 
shared frustration and support. These have left me many unforgettable memories. 
Finally, I would like to give my special thank to my family and beloved whose 
patient love supported me to complete this work. 
iii 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Literature Review 5 
3 Model 8 
3.1 Discussion 17 
3.2 Static Market Equilibrium 18 
3.3 Comparative Static Studies 29 
4 Dynamics 37 
4.1 Steady States 38 
4.2 Open or Not? 52 
4.3 Optimal Timing to Foreign Production Function 54 
4.4 Discussion 57 
5 World Economy of Production Globalization 61 
5.1 Technological Progresses in Globalization Environment 66 
5.2 Discussion 67 
6 Conclusion 69 
7 Appendix 70 
7.1 Al . Derivation of CES Technology from Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function 70 
7.2 A2. Proof of Lemma 2 73 
iv 

















An economist might consider the difference between production functions of the 
poor country and the rich country can be represented by their productivities. If 
there is absence of any technology diffusion barrier, firm in the poor country can 
costlessly adopt the production function of their rich counterpart, and enjoy the 
higher productivity. Figure 1 shows how adoption of foreign technology, point D', can 
rise the entire production function. It is represented by productivity improvement. 
The only crucial issue deserved to study seems to be the speed of technology diffusion. 
All economies around the world, as long as it is reached by technology diffusion, can 
eventually converge to the same higher level of income. How long it "eventually" 
takes becomes the subject of diffusion speed. 
But this logic neglects a fundamental consideration made by Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1969 [2])，that is any effects of technological change should be localized to partic-
ular technologies, rather than entire collection of technologies. Different points on 
the production function represent different production processes, and associated with 
each of these processes there is particular capital intensity specific to that technology. 
So in Figure 1 points A, B, C, D represent different technologies on the production 
function. On the other hand A，’B'，C，and D' represent the more productive tech-
nologies used by an advanced country. We should expect that a technical advance 
by adopting foreign technology would give rise to some spillovers and that several 
technologies would be affected^. The conclusion of productivity rise could be drawn 
^The importance of the coverage of spillover might be observed by the later development of 
Stiglitz work from learning by doing (1969[2]) to learning by learning (1988[22])，which illustrates 
some situations that spillover can affect technology of very different capital intensity. As spillover 
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only if there were spillovers to every technology along the production function. It 
means that a technical advance by adopting maglev train (D') of Japan would have 
to be such as to raise productivity on every vehicle type in Bangladesh from bul-
lock carts(A), truck(B) and to tram(C). So according to their view, the production 
function once maglev train is adopted should be ABCD'(or ABD' depended on the 
magnitude of D') rather than A'B'C'D' in Figure 1. 
Having described how firm adopts technology, whether firm is willing to adopt 
becomes the next question. Consider an example in Basu and Weil (1998[7]). In 
India, fields are harvested by bands of sweating workers, bending to use their scythes. 
In the United States one farmer does the same work, riding in an air-conditioned 
combine. Why not the Indian farmers just sit back in the combine and enjoy the 
high productivity? Obviously the answer of not adopting is simple: it is costly to 
do so. Put the scenario in sense of isocost. US's combine is capital intensive and 
more productive, represented in Figure 2 by a outward isocost cys- Given the vast 
size of labor in India, the factor market is characterized with relatively low wage but 
high rate of return of capital, as represented by a point favoring Cjndian in Figure 2. 
As a cost minimizing agent, an Indian farmer is not willing to adopt US combine 
technology. So the decision of adopting a foreign technology involves factor prices. 
Firm would adopt a technology which make more use of its cheap factor. 
However a capital intensive combine is just one realization of US technology, to 
accommodate the factor situation in US. We can think of the combine technology 
is not the motif of this thesis, we take the direct effect of adoption to dominate the spillover effect 
to neighboring technology. It avoids the situation that firm adopts the spillover technology but not 
the foreign technology. 
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in a more general context, the automated production. When there are more agri-
labors in US, the combine factory will design a lighter combine in order to have more 
labors working. So an automated production is a collection of combine technology 
with different scale of combine. However this production function is only mastered 
by US engineer but not their Indian counterpart. In the design of combine Indian 
factor situation receives no consideration. 
The above simple example figures out my main argument for the emergence of 
poverty trap. The large difference in capital levels discourages some firms in the poor 
country from adopting more productive technology. How large is "large" depends 
on domestic adaptability to foreign technology. Then, technological improvement in 
the advance countries does not necessarily benefit to the backward country, and I 
will show it do hurt sometimes. I provide a condition and timing of which open to 
foreign technology is desirable. 
Finally I extend the model to production globalization. Domestic firm is fac-
ing a continuum of foreign technology. It predicts that in steady state, either the 
technology from highest productivity country (the leader) or remains the domestic 
technology is adopted. For those adopt the leader's they do not necessarily catch up 
the income level of leader. Figure 13 summarizes three possible consequences after 
the production globalization. Countries which 1) either the adaptability or domestic 
productivity is sufficiently low will converge to poverty trap; for countries which 2) 
either of these is sufficiently high poverty trap never exists; 3) for countries in be-
tween the two cases poverty trap exists but is evitable. The qualitative difference 
between the second and the third case is that when there is a large capital shock, 
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poverty trap can nevertheless occur for countries in the third case, while countries 
in the second case are immune to any shock. The model predicts a world income 
distribution segregates into a rich convergence club of the same development level, 
and a continuum of poverty trapped countries with diverse income level. 
My goal is to provide an economic explanation, based on adaptability, to why firm 
in some countries opt to lower productivity production function, rather than based 
on why they can not do so. The former argument is more crucial for development 
strategy since in that case reducing any technology diffusion barrier will have no 
effect on development. The hinge are how adaptable^ of a poor country to adopt the 
technology of the rich country and the productivity difference. The adaptability, or 
inertia to modify on the opposite side, measures how well domestic firm adapt its idle 
input to foreign technology. It may depend on skill and education (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti 2001 [1])，vintage capital and national policy. Finally, in light of adaptbility 
and productivity as the determinant of poverty trap, I provide conditions for a 
autarky economy to open to foreign technology, as well as analysis on technological 
progress in a globalization environment. 
Rosenberg (1982，p. 271(21]) mentions an example of how Japan caught up the West: 
“ I n a variety of ways, the Japanese reduced the capital-output ratio so as to adapt Western 
technologies. In textiles, for example, they purchased older, secondhand machines.. . once installed, 
they operated the machinery at higher speeds and for longer hours, and they lavished greater 
amounts of labor in servicing the machines and maintain t h e m . . . They introduced cheaper raw 
materials into production, as in the case of cotton spinning, and then added more labor to each 
spinning machine." 
Although Japan had much less capital then, they made use of idle factor to adopt Western 
technology. 
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2 Literature Review 
Standard cross countries empirical studies have long pinned down the cause of in-
ternational income inequality either to capital accumulation, or difference in Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP). According to the first view, much of the international 
income difference is due to the difference in capital rather than TFP. Under neo-
classical framework, any production function, which characterizes with diminishing 
marginal product of capital, must guarantee the catch up of poor countries in long 
run(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992[6] and Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992[16]). The 
implication is that international income inequality, or more fundamentally the cap-
ital difference, is temporary. It is the convergence theory, conditioned on countries 
are given with the same production function. However what we observe in this cen-
tury is convergence amongst the rich, and divergence amongst the poor. My model 
complements the convergence theory by providing an economic explanation to the 
coexistence of these two pattern. 
The TFP difference approach argues that international income inequality is per-
manent since the advantage of higher TFP in rich countries is long lasting (Easterly 
and Levine 2001 [11] and Parente and Prescott 2000 [19]). This strand of models 
consists of two streams, namely focusing on the how TFP accumulation related to 
economics development in a closed economy, and how the speed of TFP diffusion 
is affected in open economy (Keller 2004[13j). The former is mainly discussed in 
endogenous growth theory and the later is studied by technology diffusion models. 
The objective of this stream of literature is to account for the persistent difference in 
technology. However, given such difference exists, why not the backward countries 
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take the free ride of technology from the advanced? Of course, one can come up with 
many stories to explain why the backward countries cannot do so. Alternatively one 
can propose productivity subjected to "discount" when spreads to other countries, 
in order to survive the criticism arisen from the non-rival property of technology and 
the existence of productivity difference across countries. However then the world 
economy, endowed with different productivity in their autarky, should converge to 
a common steady state associated with that discounted productivity. While doing 
so the entire income distribution is ceased to exist. So in literature there is a direc-
tion of explicit modeling productivity with development level (Azariadis and Drazen 
1990[3] and Basu and Weil 1998[7])，which is represented by capital level. Higher 
productivity or higher diffusion rate of so can only be happened when capital is high 
enough, or within the appropriate region. But what we concern here is a more fun-
damental problem: when will the backward countries adopt the technology of higher 
productivity? If it never happens, then attributing the low growth, if not no growth, 
to low diffusion rate is not appropriate, since diffusion indeed has never existed. 
Unlike standard poverty trap models (Azariadis and Stachurski 2005 [4]), poverty 
trap arises not due to the nonconvexity of production function or coordination failure. 
Here I do not introduce extra assumption on production function or externality. 
Production function is well-behaved in sense of classical properties: positive marginal 
production of factors and diminishing of that. Implication of our model is similar 
to Azariadis and Drazen[3], in which switch to higher productivity takes place when 
capital per labor exceeds a certain exogenous threshold. The model can be considered 
as a microfoundation explanation to this result. 
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An article with similar implication is Matsuyama(2004[18]). Of course I differ-
entiate this thesis by focusing on technology spread rather than international saving 
competition. Any country specific shock has profound effect that leads to the sta-
ble asymmetric steady state. The fundamental reason is that the world saving is 
insufficient to support every country to be rich. So there are either some poor and 
rich countries or all countries share the same medium capital. The introduction of 
borrowing constraint, of which borrower can only commit fraction a of investment 
return to be repaid, breaks the inherent stability of symmetric medium steady state. 
So there must be some shock in order to polarize the world into the rich and the poor. 
Our model captures the TFP view that productivity difference is the fundamental 
of asymmetry. Here shock during the process would also divert countries to the trap 
or the rich club, but it is not the reason why poverty trap is possible. Contrast to 
Matsuyama's model, starting from autarky, our model predicts countries will either 
converge to the rich club, or diverge amongst the poor, with or without any shock. 
7 
3 Model 
111 this section I introduce a framework to study the adoption process of foreign tech-
nology. Firstly I would clarify the meaning of technology. Then I would distinguish 
what makes foreign technology different from domestic technology. Thirdly I would 
introduce a model describing how domestic firm adapts to adopt foreign technology, 
and finally I would give conditions under which adoption takes place. 
Jones(2005[12]) and Zeira(1998[23]) start their models with similar setup. Pro-
duction needs capital^ and labor, denote as K and as N respectively. I follow Di-
amond's overlapping generation model that there are two generations: the young 
agents provide labor; and the old agents provide capital. There is no population 
growth so N is constant. K is used to make machines, and N is used to operate 
machines. We say the scale of a machine is k, if it requires k units of capital to make. 
Capital firm designs a machine such as to be operated optimally by one worker. 
What "optimally" refers will be discussed in the later text. A machine is said to 
be more capital intensive if it has a higher scale. So scale and capital intensity are 
interchangeable. A more capital intensive machine can produce more output. 
A technology is a production process turning a given scale of machine and labor 
into output. Two technologies are the same as long as the their machines are the 
same scale. We index technologies by the scale of machine. When we say technology 
:，The word "capital" is confused by its possible meaning in literature. It can refer to the scale 
of machine. In Cobb-Douglas the scale of machine is capital intensity k. It can also refer to total 
number of machines. Along Cobb-Douglas production function there is no idle labor so there are 
N pieces of machine. Furthermore, it can be the total amount of machine in the economy. It is 
quantity of machine multiplies its scale, which is always K if all saving turn into capital. We refer 
machine to the first meaning and preserve the word capital for the third meaning. 
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Av, it refers to a technology using machine which the scale is k,. Technologies are 
considered to be similar if they are characterized by similar k. Point B, B’ and 
B" in Figure 3 represent production sharing the same technology but with different 
quantity of input combinations in the isoquant diagram. A blueprint of technology is 
characterized by its scale of machine and output level. The output level of technology 
K is given by 
F" (K, N) = min[aKi^，afc/dV]’ 
k 
=afc/ciVminf—, 1 • 
K, 
where a^ and k are invariant for a given technology. So Nmm[k/K,, 1] is the number 
of K-scaled machines, a^ i^  is the maximum output level of a piece of K-scale machine. 
There must be idle labor if /c < k. So we should expect firm would try its best to 
make use of the idle labor and hence adapt to adopt a technology. Denote Q being 
the number of machine after the adaptation. The adapted output level is given by 
a is an ordinal measure of adaptability, representing how well firm can make use 
its idle labor. In later section we would study the case that a depends on k, for 
example if it is more difficult to adapt to capital intensive technology and hence 
a (k,) is decreasing. But in this introductory stage we simply treat a and k as 
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independent. Q is the effective quantity of foreign machine domestic once firm's 
adaption is performed'^. Firm can buy K/k pieces of machine from capital firm, 
and then adapts to make use of idle labor by increase its use of machine such that 
there are Q pieces of machine effectively. For example machines can operate with an 
additional night shift to double the use. So Q increases with labor, and also K/k, 
and we should expect that the increment is diminishing, a is to capture how well 
firm can make use of excess labor to substitute the scarce machines. Also Q should 
be homogenous of degree one in K/k and N, and there is no scale effect. Therefore 
we simply model Q in constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function form as 
- . . E J Z I 1 ^ 
= a l - ] “ + ( l - a ) i V 宇 ’ 
\ / 
and define the intensive form as 
Q{KW,K)三 N - = Qa cv f - j + l - a ’ 
(k\a) = a^Kq{k\(7,K). 
Qa and a are restricted in order to satisfy some characteristic conditions of 
adaptation. In case of no adaptation, d = 0, we have Q = K/k,. There is (1 — k/I^) N 
of idle labor. So for any cr > 0, Q should be bounded by K/k. from below, otherwise 
''One may ask why not the foreign firm performs the adaptation as domestic firm for a better use 
of its machine? If adaptation is possible for foreign firm, then it should be already fully represented 
by bk of foreign production function, which is the most efficient way to produce with machine. The 
property Q5 of cr rules out this possibility. On the other hand for foreign operate at k level, there 
is the corresponding bk such that f (k) > fn (k) = bj^Q (k,k\a), implied by property Q4 and Q6b. 
So the foreign firm does not adapt in either case. 
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there is no gain in performing capital modification. So we require 
-<qik\a,,,). (Ql) 
K> 
And more capital leads to more adapted machine, and higher degree of adapt-
ability leads to better use of the machine, so 
qk{k\a,K)>0, (Q2) 
-^q{k\a,K)>0 , (Q3) 
to reflect the property that Q is increasing in K!k and a. Both imply 
0 < a < 1. 
Also we assume that for any cr and k, 
g(K|(7’A：) = 1, (Q4a) 
= 0， (Q4b) 
to capture the situation that when k = k, every labor can be allocated with k and so 
they must be equipped with a piece of machine. If q (/^ |cr, k,) > 1 then the output per 
machine becomes a^nq k) > and violates the definition of a^ K,. However if 
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q ；^) < 1 then violates Ql. So equality holds. Q4a implies that 
Q4b guarantees domestic firm can not adapt with nothing. If cr > 1, then 
limg ( • ’ K) = Qa{1- 告 > 0. 
k—tO 
Therefore the range of a is given by 
0 < cr < 1. 
We define a in a way such that satisfies two limit properties. As mentioned 
above, when A is zero, the adaptation process is totally failed. So only K/k quantity 
of machine is used in the technology, and we have 
/c 
limg(/c|(7,K) = (Q5a) 
(T>0 Kj 
On the other hand, when a is one, firm is perfectly adaptive to the technology, 
"Perfect" means that firm can produce at the highest output level given k. It is as 
if the scale of machine is k rather than k. At this scale of machine, the output level 
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is fk (k) there is no adaptation and no idle labor at all. So we have 
^ m r ( k W ) = 产 ⑷ ， (Q5b) 
cr-+l 
{k\a, k,) = a^k^ 
CT—1 
ak N Y - ' 
一 = — . 
Normalize at Kq = 1 and define z 三 Gko，we have 
So Ql-Q5b implies that the functional forms of technology k are given by 
- . . 1 ^ 
广（kja) = Z K � a - j + l - a ’ (1) 
[ V ' ^ / � 
/ /vX CT 1 
F 卞,N\(7�= ZTE a ( — ) ‘‘ . ( 2 ) 
\ J 
In the isoquant diagram, B, B'" and B"" in Figure 3 represent different factor com-
binations using a technology with k equals to OB. Denote p {k\a) being the output 
ratio of technology k to technology k 
眷 端 = y 卜 ⑴ • 
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• = c v ( l - a ) + 
• = ^ L W _ . ， 
I 0 if A: I K；, 
So technology is at its highest output level when k = k. It is the capital level where 
Q = I and firm can allocate every labor with a piece of machine. No labor is idle. 
The highest efficient technology is absence of adaptation and independent to cr, and 
we simply denote as 产(k). A production function is the collection of highest efficient 
technologies, which is given by 
F = U广�N. 
K 
When the number of technology increases the production function can be more and 
more closely approximated by a smooth, differentiable Cobb-Douglas production 
function^ 
F [ K ) N ) = z I < " " N � (3) 
Therefore a point on the production function represents a particular efficient tech-
nology. Machine used in that particular technology is designed such as to use up 
all the capital and labor. So there is no adaptation and hence F is independent to 
(7. Figure 3 shows how technologies with different scale but same output level make 
up an isoquant. Here we start from CES technology and deduce Cobb-Douglas pro-
•r) Jones (2005[12]) provides an asymptotic approach to derive Cobb-Douglas production function. 
He argues for any given level of capital and labor, even the production function is Leontief at firm 
level the global production function converges to Cobb-Douglas, if the marginal products of labor 
and capital follow Pareto distribution. We share the Leontief idea as the fundamental point. 
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duction function. However it is not one way. Appendix Al show we can have CES 
technology given Cobb-Douglas production function. 
We then turn to the distinction between foreign technology and domestic pro-
duction function. Consider a two-countries model, country H and country L. Of 
course there can be the n-countries model of which a particular country is facing 
n — 1 foreign countries. Two-countries model provides a building block to build up 
a continuum model in later text. Since we focus on the development of the poor 
country, "domestic" is refered to the subjects associated to country L and "foreign" 
to country H. 
Each country consists a continuum of firm. Every firm in the same country is 
identical. Productivity is different between two countries. Foreign technology is 
benefit from a higher productivity, zh- SO given the same scale of machine, foreign 
machine can produce more. A higher foreign productivity is to generate a natural 
income inequality environment, and provide motivation for domestic firm to adopt 
foreign technology. On the other hand, foreign firm has no incentive to adopt do-
mestic technology. So the development of country H is not affected by country L, 
and at its steady state. Firm hires the young agent and borrows from the old agent, 
paying them at marginal products. Firm then buys machine from the capital firm 
to produce output. 
Variables with upper bar are reserved for objects of country H. Subscript H and 
L are the objects associated adopted foreign technology and domestic technology 
respectively. Lower case letter is per labor form. Denote k and k being capital 
intensity of country H and of country L respectively. Since firm in country H has a 
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higher productivity, they end up with higher capital intensity level at steady state. 
So we have k > k, and foreign technology is capital intensive. Domestic production 
function is given by 
!L{k) = ZLk\ (4) 
Foreign production function is given by 
~f{k) = ZHk\ 
Domestic firm can adopt the in use technology of foreign country. It can be done 
either by means of direct purchase from foreign capital firm, or of straight forward 
imitation to foreign capital firm. However it also means that an adopter country has 
no idea of entire collection of foreign technologies other than the one in use. When 
foreign technology is in use domestically, it requires /c-scaled machine and domestic 
/c-scaled machine becomes irrelevant. The adopted foreign production is given by 
_「 / a A 宇 1 ^ 
fH{k) = f'^ (k\a) = ZHT ce = + l - a . (5) 
V^/ � 
We can think of every firm in country L, which currently uses technology k, now is 
provided with an alternative of foreign technology k. So 几 and fn composite the 
collection of technologies available to the firm of country L. 
Figure 4 shows the adopted foreign technology with different a. All are all tangent 
to each other at k. fn with higher a envelops those with lower a. For any k, when 
(7 tends to one, f n tends to / . So a measures how well domestic firm can replicate 
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the entire foreign production function out of a particular technology which is the one 
foreign firm currently uses. 
3.1 Discussion 
As Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969[2]) argue that a technological advance, may be due to 
learning by doing in their context, or adoption of foreign technology in our context, 
can only leads to higher output for some technologies, which are affected by the 
spillover. So a productivity rise is only possible if domestic firm is able to adopt 
all foreign technology. Adoption of foreign technology means adoption of fn rather 
than the entire foreign production function / {k). 
Although firm in country L can use either domestic f i or foreign fn , these two 
are not perfect analog, f i is a collection of technologies, ordered by capital intensity. 
When k changes, the scale of machine also changes. Each point on 九 represents the 
most efficient design of domestic machine such as to use up all the capital and labor. 
However along fn there is only one technology, and hence one type of machine, 
which is currently in use by foreign firm. So the machine is designed to require k 
capital to make, reflecting the abundant capital quantity in foreign country. As there 
is less capital in country L, domestic firm can only afford less quantity of foreign ma-
chine and there is idle labor. Making use of idle labor, domestic firm adapts to adopt 
foreign capital intensive technology, a measures the ability of adaptation. However, 
adopting the capital intensive technology is sensible only when its productivity is 
higher, otherwise it is always less costly to produce using f i - So f n is character-
ized by a high zh- In the next section we will study when the adoption of foreign 
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technology takes place. 
3.2 Static Market Equilibrium 
Domestic firm can adopt /丄 or fn , so there are two sets of factor demand corre-
spondingly. Denote subscript L for factor demand using 九 as production function 
and subscript H for / / / . The rate of return of capital and wage using f i are the 
marginal product of technology k. Since Jl is the envelop of all domestic technology, 
the marginal product of technology k is simply the marginal product of 九 at k, 
which are given by 
VL = 广 1’ (6) 
wl = ( l - a ) z L k ' ' . (7) 
The rate of return of capital and wage using fn are given by 
•pa—i� 1 1 f k \ ~ ,… 
th = azfik a = I +l-a = , (8) 
) � J 
—1� 
WH = (1 - a) znk o； ( = I + 1 - a . (9) 
_ � 
In the competitive market, firm employs factor until the factor price equals to its 
marginal product. If f i is used, capital demanded per output and labor demanded 
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per output can be derived straightly by first order conditions®: 
k a 
T = (10) 
JL r 
i = （11) 
Domestic firm adopts the production function with a lower unit cost. The unit cost 
is given by rik-\-Wi. The unit cost of 九 can be obtained by constrained minimization 
of unit cost^, which is given by 
f rY f w 
cl= — 二 ， 
VLJ \WLJ 
where rZ = oizl, and wZ = (1 — a) zl- Also, we have the factor demands and unit 
cost for f n 
去 = ⑶ > 广 1 广 ’ （12) 
y W M r . 湖 
6 Of course, the factor demand should be a function of relative factor price to goods price, rather 
than simply factor price. However in the competitive equilibrium goods price equals to unit cost, 
which is one. One should caution the stated factor demands are in reduced form. In deriving the 
isocost, the goods price is represented by the Langrange multiplier 
7 Again, Ci is a collection of isocost derived from different technology. The isocost of domestic 
technology k is given by 
- , r � i _ � / w � i _叫 
cl = a ( + (1 - a) ( ^ • 
Denote the sets (x) = { ( w ’ r ) |c艺(w r^) > x} and Cl {x) = { ( w ’ r ) \cl {w,r) > x } . Then it 
can be shown that Cl, (a;) = j ^ C ^ (x ) . That is Ci, = x is the collection of the lowest isocosts. 
K 
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「 / \ / \ 1 - … " ( 1 一。） ( r \ , . f w \ ch = OL — + (1 _ a) 二 ， 
• VH) \whJ 」 
where rJJ = aznk'^ \ and W^ = (1 — a) ZHk�, 
Factor market is cleared when factor demand equals to factor supply. So k 
appeared in (12), (13), (10) and (11) refer to k which is provided by the old agents. 
Competitive equilibrium results in zero profit condition, that is Ci = 1. So every 
(lu, r) on the isocost Ci = 1 represents competitive equilibrium wage and rate of 
return of capital. Figure 5 shows 0^ = 1 and c// = 1 in li； — r dimension. 
In the standard model with only one production function, firm only determines 
the factor demanded. In our framework which foreign technology is available to be 
chosen, firm but also has to determine the production technology. So determination 
of equilibrium involves two stages. In the first stage, given a production technology, 
there exists unique (ly*, r*), represented by a distinct points on q = 1 such that 
clears the factor market. If 九 is used, dividing (10) by (11)，we have 
^ = (14) 
r a 
Then equilibrium (wl,rl) is the intersection point of (14) and cl = 1. Given k, 
(wl, r1) exists and unique, since in the w — r dimension, (14) is upward sloping 
while = 1 is downward sloping. Similarly for fn , dividing (12) by (13), we have 
—=-———if I . 15 r a \k J 
Determination of (w*ff, r*fj) follows the same logic, which is the intersection of (15) 
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and Ch = 1. Figure 6 shows how, given k, two pairs of (u**, r*) are arisen. 
In the second stage, firm observes w and r, and employs factor until the factor 
price equals to its marginal product. Then firm chooses between 九 and f i which 
incurs a lower unit cost. In the ultimate equilibrium there would be competitive 
factor prices clear the factor market; and the factor prices in turn reinforce the 
use of the equilibrium production technology. However, the choice of production 
technology would be indifference if both yield the same unit cost. In such an situation 
the underlying rate of return of capital and wage are the intersection points of cl = 1 
and Ch = 1. 
The production technology with a lower cost can be found by deviation check. 
Suppose all firms in country L are using Jl- Then (u/l,rl) are the equilibrium rate 
of return of capital and wage satisfying c^ (wl, r£) 二 1. Firm will not deviate to 
using fn if cl (wl, r艺 )=1 < ch {wl, rl). Since ch is homogenous of degree one in w 
and r, it implies that there exists a < 1 such that ch (aiu^, ar^) = 1. Observe that 
{wl, rl) and (awl, ^'^D are on the same ray in w - r dimension, so fi incurs lower 
unit cost if Cl is outermost in the Northeastern direction. On the other hand if 
incurs lower unit cost then Ch is outermost, following the same argument. When 
(w*, r*) satisfy both cl = 1 and Ch = 1, firm is indifferent between fi and fu . 
So equilibrium {w*, r*) is the union of the outermost portion of isocost cl = I and 
Ch = 1. It is shown as the bold and dased line in Figure 5. 
Formally speaking, adoption of foreign technology takes place if f n is less costly 
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under {w, r). That is given by 
f f wV'"" 厂 /r�i一" / �1-疗"11 八 1-力 
= = � a = + (1 - a ) = ’ 
\tl) \WLJ \JH J \WHJ 
0> A(l-a)X - + Aa = C{X), (16) 
where 
/ \ 1—a 
/ ii}(y \ 
X(w,r) = — ^ ^ ^ , (17) 
\r [1 — a) k J 
/ \ l—a 
A = < 1 . 
Then I would like to show there is an interval on w/r within which C (X (w/r)) < 0. 
Firstly I would like to show there are two roots for C {X) = 0, by noting that 
C' (X) = (1 - a) (A - X " ^ ) . 
The turning point X is given by 
J? - yTi/" ’ 
and so the value of C (X) at the tuning point 
C (J?) =Aa{l- 一 1/") < 0. 
Since we have C (0) = /lo； > 0 and C (oo) = oo, as well as C {X) is monotonically 
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increasing, so C (X) is U-shape and must pass through the x-axis twice. Denote 
Xi < X2 being the roots solving C {Xj) = 0, and Wj and Vj being the underlying 
factor price for Xj, j = 1,2. Then (16) reduces to 
< X < X 2 , 
Wi W W2 < — < . 
ri r r2 
At (wj.rj) we have C (Xj) = 0 and so cl = Ch. Therefore there is a continuum of 
{wj, Tj) satisfying c^ = c// as long as {wj, rj) maintains the same Wj/rj. However 
there is only one out of this continuum (Wj, rj) such that Cl {wj, Vj) = Ch —j, r/) = 1. 
It is the equilibrium (zero profit) factor price and we simply denote it as (wj, Vj) to 
avoid too much notation. 
The following lemma concludes the equilibrium production technology as a func-
tion of (u), r) 
Lemma 1 Given both (wi.ri) and (1^2’�2)，which Wi/ri < W2IT2, satisfying both 
Cl = 1 and C// = 1. Equilibrium production technology depends on w/r: 
1. Wfien w/r < Wi/ri or w/r > W2/r2, every firm remains using domestic 
production function f^. 
2. When Wi/ri < w/r < W2/r2, every firm adopts foreign technology fn. 
3. When w/r = Wi/ri or w/r = W2/r2, firm is indifferent between fi and fn, 
some firm uses Jl (and also some uses fn) technology. 
Recall that the above lemma depends on factor prices only. So the above lemma 
reflects the second stage of equilibrium determination and factor market may not be 
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cleared. Then we have to determine the equilibrium factor price. Recall (14) and 
(15) being the factor demand for and f n 
叫 = ( l - ~ / : ’ 
TL Oi ‘ 
^ _ ( l - a ) f e (kV'"" 
77/ a \kj 
Then we have the following economic fundamentals version of Lemma 1，which 
the conditions are stated in term of k. 
Lemma 2 For j = 1,2，denote 
uL — 呼 
� ~ r “ l - a ) ， 
uH _ [ “ 切 j a Y 
1. When k < kf or k > k^, every firm remains using domestic production 
function fi. 
2. When k^ < k < k^, every firm adopts foreign technology fn-
Proof. Appendix A1 • 
Appendix A1 also shows that 
/cj < k-^� k < k<2 於2 
Let h denote measure of domestic firm adopting /"，in order words 1 — h would 
be the measure of firm adopting fi- By above lemma, when k < k^ oi k > k^ ^ all 
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firms will use fi- Then w/r function is given by (14), and h = 0. For k^ < k < k^, 
all firms adopt fn and h = 1. w/r is given by (15). 
To complete the model I have to consider the situation when kf < k < k^ and 
k2 < k < k^. It is the third case of Lemma 1 in which Ci are the same. Firm is 
indifferent between two production technologies. Consider kf < k < k^. Figure 7 
shows the case. Within this range, we must have w/r = wi/ri, otherwise Ci are not 
equal and hence there is a production function strictly preferred. For firm using 九， 
wi/ri is given by 
— A/i • 
ri a 
For firm using / / / , Wi/ri is given by 
wi — {l-a)k f/cfV" 
— • 
A \ K J 
So there must be some firms using Jl and the rest using fn- li h = 0, then 
is given by (14) 
wl _ (1 - a) k {1- a)kk^ _ Wi 
rl a a 石 ri ’ 
it leads to contradiction. On the other hand, if /i = 1, then w*h!r*H is by (15) 
^ (l-a)fe /^y/" [l-a)k 一 ^ 
r^ \%J a \k J n ‘ 
that is w*HIr*H < W\lr\ and contradictory again. So there must be some firm adopting 
Jl and the rest f n such as to keep (u»£，7^ 2) and {w^, r^) to Wi/ri. It implies firm 
using Jl to borrow k^ from the old agent , and firms using f n to borrow /cf. Factor 
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market clearance means there exists an unique h, where 0 < h < 1, such that 
k = hk^ + /cf, 
— k - k i 
- A f - A f . 
There is a similar result for k^ <k < k^, which is given by 
k = hk? + (1 - h) kg, 
_ k^-k 
h ~ p； 
凡2 一〜2 
Figure 8 concludes how all the /c] are determined by corresponding wi/ri and 如2卜2. 
We update Lemma 2 to following proposition: 
Proposition 1 Denote h being the share of domestic firm adopting fn, then: 
1. When k < /cf, h = 0. 
2. When k^ < k < k^, h = {k - /cf) / (Af - fcf). 
3. When k^ < k < k^, h = l. 
I When k^ <k<k^,h= {k^ - k) / {k^ - fcf). 
5. When k > k^, h = 0. 
There exists a threshold /cf of capital beyond which adoption of foreign technology 
occurs. When k < k^ every domestic firm would find foreign technology more costly 
and so remain using their original technology, though f i is less productive.When 
ki < k < , the portion of domestic firm using foreign technology is increasing 
with k. In this range of k, there are h of domestic firms using foreign technology with 
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/c-scaled machine, and the rest using domestic technology with fcf-scaled machine. 
Both kinds of firm pay the same factor prices. These h fraction of firms borrow 
k^ from the old agent. Since kf > k there is idle labor in these firms and hence 
they adapt to adopt foreign technology. When there is more capital available to be 
borrowed, there will be more firms turning to adopt foreign technology. All domestic 
firms will adopt foreign technology when capital is greater than k^. It is the capital 
threshold which all domestic firms abandon domestic technology. 
The threshold model is not new in the literature. Azariadis and Drazen (1990 [3]) 
have set up a similar framework. I make a step forward by deriving a microfoundation 
framework of how threshold arise. Our model setting is natural in sense that there 
is no externality and the market is perfect and competitive. So no matter f j j or 九 
is chosen it is the optimal choice for the agents in economy, without any imperfect 
information or indirect externality effect. 
A striking difference from Azariadis and Drazen's paper is that the transition 
from domestic technology to foreign technology is continuous. Within the range 
k^ < k < a higher capital level will result in a higher portion of domestic firm 
adopting foreign technology. Our model rejects the possibility of the existence of Big 
Bang threshold; transition should undergo a gradual process. 
Another interesting feature predicted by the model is that there exist another 
capital threshold k^ such that firm will start to switch back to / l . Since X2 > X 
so k2 > k. That is when the capital is high, even higher than the steady state 
of advanced foreign economy, enough, foreign technology will be more costly than 
domestic one. It is because when k is much larger than k，there is idle foreign 
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machine. How well domestic firm can make use of the idle machine depends on the 
adaptability parameter a. So when k is sufficiently large and hence there are many 
idle foreign machine, domestic firm will find foreign technology more costly. However 
this case is not realistic and out of our focus. 
Finally, in preparation for Dynamics section, we are going to study the equilib-
rium wage as a function of k. Firstly, note that when k^ < k < k^ (and also k^ 
< k < k^), we have 
^ Wi 
but also 
wl = w*fj = wi= wl (/cf) = WH [ki)， 
since by definition {wiri) is the intersection point of Ci {wl, r l ) and C2 (W^^r^j). 
Combine with the result of Lemma 1, the equilibrium wage w (k) is given by 
‘Wl {k) if /c < /cf 
w^  if /cf < /c < A;f 
= < Wh {k) , if k^ <k< k 号. (18) 
W2 iik^ <k< k^ 
�Wl {k) if k > k^ 
Figure 9 displays the equilibrium wage function with different cr. The range of k is 
truncated up to k. For any equilibrium wage function shown in Figure 9, the flatten 
portion represents the range k^ < k < /cf, which is the second region of k in (18). 
In this range of k, equilibrium wage is constant. Since we have k^ < any increase 
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in k will be absorbed by more firm using fn. Equilibrium wage within the range 
/c < /cf is given by (7) and within the range k^ < k < k is given by (9). 
3.3 Comparative Static Studies 
In this section, I would like to study how the basic environment affects adoption. 
The key parameter in our framework is adaptability parameter a. First of all I would 
like to show that higher a never yields lower output, ie df/da > 0. It is because if 
firm chooses to domestic production 九，a does not matter. While if firm chooses to 
foreign production higher a would yields higher output since 
祭 n + ( i - + g ( j ^ ) l ， (19) 
da \(x/ \1 — a J 
where tt being the share of capital using / / / , which is given by 
rnk 
" = 7 7 ) ^ 
= — — • (20) 
广 + l - a 
The term in the big bracket of (19) is given by the concavity property of log function, 
which implies for any positive number x and y 
fx\ 
a; log — > X — y. 
\yj 
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So we have 
1 兀 
TT log — > TT — a, 
a 
/ I 一 TT� (1 - tt) log > a - n , 
乂1 一 Q； 乂 
Sum up two inequalities and proof the term is always positive. 
Then we turn to study the capital threshold. In previous section I show that 
some firms start to adopt foreign technology when k > kf and every firm adopts 
foreign technology when k > /cf^ , I would like to study how adaptability parameter 
(J affects and k^. Recall that k^ and k^ are determined by Xi, 
( t ) = 而 = < 1 ’ 削 
where X\ is the smaller root of C (X) = 0 
C{X) = + = 
—X-” = - { A - a 
where 
/ \ l-a 
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Since C (X) is U-shaped and Xi is the smaller root, we have C (X)' < 0. It implies 
CiXiY = A ( l - a ) - ( l - a ) X f " < 0 , 
X T > A , 
Since C (Xi) = 0，we have 
(1 - oO - x r ) = - X j - " ) ’ 
^ V ‘ ^ ‘ 
negative positive 
X 广 < A < X广. （22) 
Since a have no appearance in (16), so its effect is through A, which is given by 
dA \ n 
— = - ^ l o g — > 0 do- \zhJ 
Recall that 
^ = 於 a � 0 
OA A(l-a) ’ 
dXi dXi dXi 
= dA dA 
Therefore differentiate the left equality of (21) and we have 
1 dXi 1 {k{\ , 1 、1 dk^ 
Z ‘ = _log � + ( 1 - … 碎 
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The trick to sign dk^/da is by making use the result of (22), which is given by 
耐 - 对 lo〔；^l -a log A < 0 
dcT (1 — a ) (1 _ o f S i . . 
<1 
^ ^ ‘ 
. negative . 
Therefore a higher adaptability to foreign technology reduces the capital thresh-
old. Then I would like to study how a affect which is given by 
斤 = ^ ( f y , (23) 
= / c f l o g ^ < 0 . 
da \ k J ki' da 
Lemma 3 We have dk^/da < 0 and dk^/da < 0. 
These above result can be represented in Figure 10. Higher a represents firm 
is more adaptable to a given technology. Since domestic firm is fully acknowledged 
to domestic technologies, it can avoid adaptation by changing the scale of domestic 
machine. It is represented by moving along the domestic production function f i . So 
a change in adaptability parameter does not result any effect on domestic production 
function. However the effect of higher adaptability is exerted on technology level. 
It means firm becomes more capable to make use of its idle labor to substitute 
scarce machine, and the marginal product of labor increases. So firm using foreign 
technology becomes able to pay a higher wage. As the range < k < k^ is, the 
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range of capital in which both kinds of technologies are equally competitive, in sense 
of unit cost. When firm is more adaptable to foreign technology, adoption of f n can 
occurs at a lower capital level. It results in dk^/da < 0 and dk^/da < 0. 
A particular interest in sense of later dynamic section is the effect on equilibrium 
wage. The equilibrium wage is given by (18) 
• 
wl (k) if k< /cf 
= < wi , ifkf <k<k^ -
WH (k) iik^ <k<k 
We skip the case which k > k. a has no effect on wl, SO equilibrium wage does not 
change for k < k^. Since we have wl {k)' > 0 and dk^/da < 0’ then it implies 
= 二 学 < 0. 
do da da 
It is shown in Figure 9，where a higher sigma would always result in a lower flatten 
part of w (k). The flatter part would be lefter since dk^/da < 0 and dk^Ida < 0. 
Then we look into the case k^ < k < k, where equilibrium wage is wh (k). First 
note that (20) implies as long as A: < /c, we have 
TT > a. 
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Then after tedious expansion and simplification, the effect of a on wh is given by 
dwH WH , _«、， / I — 7r\ _ 、， / I — 7r\ , TT � 
子 = ( 1 、 2 log - — — + l -TT log - — — + 7 r l o g - > 0 . 
do a{(j-l) , 乂 1 —a乂 \1 - aj a 
� S/ ‘ � V ^ 
positive positive _ 
where the second term in the big bracket is shown positive by the trick used in 
proving dfn/da > 0. So a higher sigma result in higher equilibrium wage for any k 
within (/cf, k) . It coincides to the second theorem in Klump and de La Grandville 
(2000[15]). Figure 9 concludes how sigma changes the shape of the equilibrium wage 
function. 
Our next interested parameter would be domestic productivity zl and foreign 
productivity zn. While zh would be more complicate as it affects adoption both 
through / / / and foreign steady state k. I first look to zl, which increases A in 
equation 16. 
dA (1 - c r ) A ^ 二 ^ L > 0 
dzL ZL 
dk^ dk{ dXi dA _ Ak (l-a)Xi + a 乂！^�• 
— dXi dA'^^ {1-a) {A- X � " ) ‘ � • 
To check the comparative static on dkf /dzi , note (23) and we have 
^ = • ( l - o Q X L + a 卢 〉 0 
dzL 一 Zl (1-a) {A-X^") ‘ • 
Lemma 4 we have dk^/dzi > 0，dk^/dzi > 0. 
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A higher zl will result domestic technology less costly for any scale of machine. So 
domestic technology is more competitive. Both the capital threshold to adopt foreign 
technology and the capital threshold to abandon domestic technology increase. 
Zh can directly affect k\ and indirectly through k. We look into the effect through 
k first, k as the steady state of country H is given by 
k = w [k) = (1 — Q；) Zffk�. 
So TJi can be simplified as 
— 7-a-l Oi 
th = oiZHk = . 
1 — a 
Since k does not enter (16), so it has no effect on Xi. So 
dk� /ui _ 
- 4 = 4 〉 0 ’ 
dk k 
dk k 
dzH ZH{1 - aY 
dzH Zh{1 - a)' 
Beside its positive effect on k, zh has its negative effective on A. The overall effect 
should be ambiguous since both are in the opposite direction. The trick to determine 
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the signs is to compare the unit cost of two different zh. The unit cost is given by 
r / \ l - a / \ l - a 1 V ( l - … 
I r \ , . f w \ 
Ch = a = + (1 - c c ) = ， 
[ V h J \WhJ J 
f r(l - a)\ . , f w\ 
= n ^ J + ( i - 。 ) ( f ) _ • 
So when a higher zh results in a higher k, it also results in a lower ch, at any given 
r and w. At equilibrium, Ch = I and it shifts to the right in Figure 10. It results in 
a lower Wi/ri and a higher 如2卜2. By (14), we then have a lower /cf. So the direct 
effect on /cf dominates the indirect effect through k. However the sign of k^ can not 
be determined. To end this section, the following proposition concludes all above 
results on the capital thresholds 
Proposition 2 Denote k^ being the minimum capital level which domestic firm 
starts to adopt foreign technology, and k^ being the minimum capital level which 
all domestic firms adopt foreign technology, then we have 
1. kf is decreasing in adaptability and foreign productivity, and increasing in 
domestic productivity. That is kf = kf a, z^, ； . 
+ + / 
忍 . i s decreasing in adaptability, and increasing in domestic productivity. That 
is /cf = /cf (a,ZL,ZH . 
+ ？ / 
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4 Dynamics 
In this section, I introduce the dynamic framework of capital. Wage is saved when 
agents are young, and consumed when they are old. Wage is paid according to 
competitive marginal product of labor. For simplicity, capital is assumed to be fully-
depreciated in one period in order to avoid problems arisen from vintage capital. 
Capital in next period depends on wage saved in this period，which is given by 
kt+i = w (kt) = ft- f'th. 
where f is the equilibrium production function mentioned in above section. Since 
capital is vanished for each period, domestic firm can update the scale of machine 
used in domestic production. However when foreign technology is used the scale 
can not change. Recall (18), the resulted equilibrium wage regarding equilibrium 
production function is 
Wl (k) if /c < /cf 
^ (^) = < wi , if fcf < /c < /cf • 
wh (k) iik^ <k<k 
\ 
where 
= Wl (/cf) = WH ( / c f ) , 
The case which k > k is skipped. A saving is turned into production capital of next 
period, and paid at its competitive marginal product, which is rt+i = f (kt+i)-
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One should note, regardless of whether fi or fn is used, k should be recognized as 
the amount of capital available to build up machine. In the first case of w (k), wl (k) 
represents a collection of equilibrium domestic technologies 九，which is ordered by-
its capital intensity. Whenever capital changes, domestic firm will change to another 
technology blueprint with different scale of domestic machine. In the second case of 
w (k), there are mixing of firms using fi or fn- Each of these firms pays the same 
wage such that it is indifferent to either technology. Such indifferent wage is (locally) 
unique and so equilibrium wage remains constant in this range. Any increase in k 
will be absorbed by increase in firms using fn- When k increase to such a level 
that is beyond the second case and enter to the third case, the indifferent wage can 
not be sustained. Every domestic firm adopts fn- Equilibrium technology becomes 
/ / / , and hence scale of machine remains constant at k. To summarize, the evolution 
of capital under the first case of w (k) represents a continuous change of domestic 
technology, which is increasing in the scale of machine. However in the second case 
the evolution of capital represents an increasing share of domestic firms using foreign 
technology. In the third case the evolution of capital represents an accumulation of 
foreign machine with constant scale k. 
4.1 Steady States 
At steady state, there is no further evolution of capital and hence satisfies 
k = w [k). (24) 
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Given f i is equilibrium, the steady state k^  is autarky in sense of isolation from 
foreign technology fn- k satisfies 
k = ( 1 - a ) 
= [ ( l — a ) 4 ] " ( i - a ) ’ 
Then I would like to show that in autarky if /c is a steady state for domestic pro due-
� �n 
tion function then k is also a steady state for domestic technology k^. Wage paid 
according to technology k is given by 
= ( 1 - 如 广 + 叫 〜 孕 u ’ 
= k . 
So at autarky steady state, not only capital but also technology does not change, 
regardless the value of cr. It is because all technologies are tangential to production 
function. Similarly, /c is a steady state for a foreign production function as well as for 
foreign technology k. So k is also a steady state for country L if every domestic firm 
uses foreign technology. In plain words it is steady whenever a poor country has the 
capital of rich country and use the technology of that. So a poor country can catch 
8 Unique steady state is guaranteed given 几 is equilibrium production function, since 
vol = -a^L (1 一 af <0<w' = azL(l- a)广丄 
so w only cuts at origin and k. 
•‘ However k is stable from production function point of view does not necessarily imply k is 
stable from technology point of view. It is only gauranteed li a > a. This condition will be studied 
in the later text. 
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up the income of the rich country, by adopting foreign technology, if 1) all domestic 
firm are willing to use foreign technology, and 2) it can converge to k. The following 
lemma shows that 1) can happen when country L opens to foriegn technology from 
its autarky steady state, f n is adopted, at least for some of the domestic firms. 
Lemma 5 When fn is available to country L, fi can not be equilibrium production 
function and k can not be a steady state. 
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose at k, equilibrium production technology 
is / l , then 
切⑷ 他(石)—(l-a)~ 
r闪 rjr (巧 ^ 
Define X as following, 
� 卜\ I _ (^) \ 
X ^ X(k)= , 
Then C ( x ) is given by (16) 
= A{l-a)X + 
= y l ( a — l ) ( l - < 0 . 
that means is less costly. Firm would not adopt and lead to contradiction. 
QED • 
i()But it is not necessarily implies at k 二 k every firm must adopt / / / . If all firms adopt f j j , the 
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Lemma 5 shows that k can only be the steady state for capital but not for 
domestic technology k. At /c, wage paid by domestic technology k will not evolve 
further, and so no further capital is accumulated. However at k, domestic firm finds 
fn less costly and so abandons fi-
We turn to another case, given fn is equilibrium, no further evolution of capital 
implies 
_ 「 1 古 
k = WH {k) = (l-a) zhT af = ] " +l-a . (25) 
Since k is the steady state of country H, it satisfies 
k = (1 — a) ZHk\ 
then for any k satisfies (25) is equivalent to corresponding X (k) satisfies S {X) = 0 
S(X) = { l - a ) X - + a = 0， 
underlying X is given by 
Xh = A^T^. 
Then 
C (X//) = (1 -cv) A -A^ +Aa 
which can be positive or not. In the positive case, all of the firm would not adopt f n either. An 
analog is the mixed game of paper, rock and scissor: when player 1 plays paper, player 2 would play 
scissor; however when player 2 plays scissor, player 1 would play rock, ie there is no equilibrium of 
certain action. Given every firm adopts f ^ , a typical firm deviates to adopt to save unit cost; 
however when every firm know their counterpart adopt f n , a typical firm deviates to adopt 几 . S o 
the positive case represents steady state is in the second case of Lemma 1, Proposition 1 and (18). 
But adopting fn can not be steady for k since k = wl ( fc)丰 ujh (k). 
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where X u in C {X) is given by combining (17) and (15), 
,、i-g 
X ⑷ = 二 . 
\kj 
Also we have 
which is monotonically increasing, so S (X) is U-shape. Since 5(0) = o； > 0 and 
S (oo) = oo > 0, 5 (X) = 0 has either no root or double roots. Obviously X (^) = 1 
is one of the roots, so S (X) = 0 must have double roots. Therefore given / / / is 
equilibrium, there are two steady states, k and k, satisfy k = wh {k). The local 
stability condition of capital evolution process requires 
切'H < 1’ 
11 Note that the expression is given that f n is equilibrium production function. On the contrary 
if / l is equilibrium, the expression of X should be 
• 广 
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which is equivalent 12 to 
S' (X) > 0. (26) 
I first check the stability of these two steady states. Then, following the same 
track of checking k, I would check whether is equilibrium technology at these two 
steady states. The stability condition helps to determine whether fn is equilibrium 
for each root of S (X) = 0. It is stable means it is locally converging. Recall k is the 
stable steady state of country H, so k is also a stable steady state of country L if 
S' {X (k)) =a-a<0 
Since S {X) is U-shape, roots have opposite slopes, so we have S' {X {k)) < 0 < 
S' [X (k)) and hence k is stable implies k is unstable. Also the monotonic increasing 
property of S' and X {k) implies k > k. The following lemma summarizes the 
stability properties of k and k. 
Lemma 6 Given a steady state k of country H. If cr > a, there are two levels of 
capital, k > k, such that both satisfy k = wh {k). k is stable while k is unstable; If 
a < a, then k < k and that both satisfy k = wh {k). k is unstable while k unstable. 
12 It is because 
罗 二 r - i K - i - 广 1) 
= …一 -广 2 ) 
s' 二 — 
Therefore 5V|s(x)=o > 0 to^ < 1 
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To avoid taxonomical exposition, we focus on the case where 
Assumption a > a. 
Assumption guarantees that country L can attain the income level of country H, 
which is fn {k). The Assumption also implies that k > k. Violation of Assumption 
means k is unstable and diverging. Unless k > k, which is unlikely in real life, 
country L always converge toward origin. So it is a strong poverty trap.Also it 
means k is not stable at technology level. Then it raise a problem that, if country H 
shares the same adaptability parameter, country H can not converge to k. Of course 
adaptability can be different across countries, which is studied in later globalization 
section, such that firm in country H can be sufficiently adaptable to avoid the above 
problem. It is reminded that Assumption is not crucial to the existence of poverty 
trap, however, it aviods many situations which is not our focus. 
Having determined the stability at k and 左，we then check whether fn is equi-
librium production technology. The stability condition can be useful. When k = k, 
which implies X = 1, we have C ( l ) = ^ — l < O a s shown in above section. So f ^ 
is equilibrium production function for A; = A; regardless whether it is stable or not. 
For k = k, the corresponding X satisfies S (X) = 0 implies 
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So C (X) is given by 
C(X) = Ail-ajX-X^'^' + Aa, 
= { A - 2C-''). 
Therefore when k = k , fn is equilibrium production technology if zl, zh and a 
satisfies the following inequality 
C{X) < 0’ 
A < 2r-"’ 
\ [kj ’ 
zl^zh I f ] . (27) 
It is to show the second term^^ on the right hand side of inequality is always smaller 
than one. Of course if it is greater than one, then the inequality becomes obsolete 
and always holds for any zi ^ zh. Consider the cases whether k = k is unstable or 
not. If (J > a, then by lemma we have 1 - a / a > 0 and k/k < 1. So the second 
term on the right hand side of inequality is less than one. On other hand, if cr < a, 
then we have 1 — a / a < 0 and k/k > 1，the second term is nevertheless smaller than 
^•"^ Note that the term k/k is independent to zl and zh since it satisfies S {X) = 0’ which is given 
by 
( 1 - … ( i ) - ( , ) 一 。 
which is free of zl and zh- W e are "safe" to treat k/k as a constant and only the magnitude of 
zl/zh is sufficient to determine whether inequality 27 is satisfied or not. 
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one. In sum, for any given cr, there always exists a sufficiently small (large) Zl such 
that above inequality holds (does not hold), and fn is (not) equilibrium production 
function. 14 The following lemma summarizes the above. 
Lemma 7 Under Assumption, if domestic (foreign) productivity is sufficient low 
(high) that (27) is satisfied, then k = k is a stable steady state while k = k is an 
unstable steady state. In both steady state fn is equilibrium production function. If 
(27) is not satisfied, then the unique steady state is k = k, which is stable and Jh is 
equilibrium. 
We then search for another steady state besides k and k. Recall the equilibrium 
wage function is given by (18) 
‘ W l (k) if A; < fcf 
Wl iik^ <k< Af 
切（於）二 Wh (k) ， i f Af < fc < Af . 
W2 if /cf < A; < k^ 
� W l {k) if /c > /C2 
Lemma 5 has shown steady state is impossible in the first and fifth case of (18). It is 
because if not the case, then a domestic firm is to use f i and there exists k* such that 
k* = Wl (k*). However although k* exists, Lemma 5 has shown fi is not equilibrium 
production function at k*. Lemma 6 has shown there is at least one steady state 
" T h a t is the second term on the right hand side of inequality 27 is always smaller than one 
regardless Assumption is hold or not. Again Assumption is shown not crucial in our qualitative 
result. 
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when fn is equilibrium, which is k. It is in the third case of (18). What remains to 
check is whether a steady state can happen when there are mixing of firm using f i 
or / / / , which is in the second case of (18). We skip the study for forth region since 
it implies k > k. 
Consider k^ < k < k^. Suppose there is a steady state k* such that 
/cf <k* = w i < k^. (28) 
The first inequality of (28) implies 
,r 一 1 — a , r 
kf < wi = r i / c f , 
a' 
r ^ < 叫 W 广 1 . 
So we can simplify the first inequality of (28) as 
The first equality of (28) must hold since recall that a^t k = k domestic firm does not 
adopt / l , SO k > KF otherwise k is in the first case of (??). The second inequality of 
(28) implies 
l - a - / / c f V / " 
於 1 > = kri ， 
a \ k J 
-zL- < a +1 - a. 
\ k J \ k J 
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Recall our previous introduction of S (X) , the above inequality is equivalent to 
S{X ( / c f ) ) > 0. 
The subcases of steady state in Lemma 7 can be used to determine whether the 
above inequality holds. In the first case of Lemma 7，in which there are double 
steady states in the third case of (??) , every firm must adopt f n regardless the local 
stability, so we have k^ < k [< k^) and k" < k[< k^) . Since X (k) is increasing 
in k, we have X (k^) < X {k) < X (k) = 1. We already know S {X) is U-shape 
with S {X (k)) = S(X (k)) = 0’ so we have S {X ( / c f ) ) > 0 and (28) must hold 
in the first case of Lemma 7. Therefore there is a steady state in /cf, k^ . Since 
equilibrium wage is constant in that interval, we have u*' = 0 < 1 and the steady 
state must be stable. In sum, if (27) satisfies, it implies there is another stable steady 
state in /cf, k^ . 
In another subcase of Lemma 7, which (27) does not hold, there is only one 
steady state in the third region, which is k = k. fn is not equilibrium production 
function at k = k implies k < k^ < k^^. So X (k) < X (kf) < X {k) and hence 
S {X ( / c f ) ) < 0. Therefore if k is unique steady state in [/cf , it implies there is 
no steady state in /cf, k^ . 
On the other hand, it can be shown, by similar trick, that it is impossible to 
have steady state in the forth case of (??) , that is k^ < k < k^. It is proved by 
Lr)By symmetry of equation 7? k> k^ can also implies fn is not equilibrium production function. 
However this possibility is ruled out since k^ > k and violates to the fact that k > k given k is 
stable. 
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contradiction. Suppose there is a steady state k* such that 
k^ <k* = W2< k^. 
The first inequality implies 
S{X ( /cf) ) < 0. 
However, in the first subcase of Lemma 7, firm must adopt fn when k = k or 
k = k, so we have k < k^ and k < k^, which means X (k^) < max X (k) {k). 
Therefore S [X [k")) > 0. In the second subcase of Lemma 7, firm adopts fn when 
k = k but not when k = k. It implies k^ < k < k and X (k^) < X (k). Since S is 
U-shape and strictly decreasing before the first root, we have S [X {k^)) > 0 and 
lead to contradiction. 
The following theorem concludes the above results. 
Theorem 1 Given Assumption a > a, if (27) holds, there are three steady states, 
k* < k< k. Then: 
1. At k = k* = Wl, it is a stable steady state where there are mixing of firms 
adopting fi and ///; 
2. At k = k, it is an unstable steady state where all firms adopt fn', 
3. At k = k, it is a stable steady state where all firms adopt ///； 
If (27) does not hold, then k = k is unique and also stable steady state where all 
firms adopt ///. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 characterize the dynamics for the cases when (27) holds 
and does not hold respectively. The Theorem concludes that poverty trap k* arises 
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if the productivity difference (z l /zh ) is sufficiently large (small) that (27) holds. In 
the case of poverty trap, k serves as a threshold of capital beyond which country L 
can converge to the level of the rich, k, otherwise country L converges to the poverty 
trap k*. Convergence to the rich takes place since the every firm in the poor country 
would adopt foreign production technology, induced by a less unit cost. However, 
when capital is not enough, domestic production function would be less costly. The 
less productive domestic production function resulted in less wage saved for next 
period capital, and a lower level steady state k*. 
Adoption of foreign production function is the necessary condition but not the 
sufficient condition for convergence to the rich. We see in the Figure 14 adoption of 
Jh begins to take place when k > k^. In this stage of development any additional 
capital increases the share of firms adopting / / / , until k reaches . All firms adopt 
fn when k > k^ . However development beyond k^ does not guarantee convergence 
to the rich. When k^ < k < k, wage paid by firms is not enough to sustain next 
period capital to adopt / " , and the economy converges to poverty trap k*. In the 
trap there is mixing of firm adopting f i and 
In absence of foreign technology country L will converge to autarky steady-
state. While opening to foreign technology f ^ may not guarantee country L to catch 
up country H. On the contrary, opening can result in poverty trap. Of course country 
L can nevertheless be better off if the income level of poverty trap is higher than 
autarky. But I would show in later text that it is never the case. The existence 
of poverty trap roots in the conflict between the interest of firm and the interest 
of labor. Firm would choose a technology incurring less cost, while it may come 
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from either higher productivity or lower factor price. When the later is the primary 
reason, less wage is paid and hence less capital will be accumulated. Poverty trap 
arises from its vicious cycle. On the other hand, if the former causes the adoption 
of / / / , country L can launch a benign cycle. It will converge to k. 
At the poverty trap, capital is given by k* = wl = Wh- There are two competing 
force exerted on Wh, namely a higher foreign productivity and a capital intensive 
foreign machine. A higher wage is paid by fn as labor becomes more productive when 
using foreign machine, whose productivity is higher. However, since foreign machine 
is capital intensive, firm can afford less machine and labor becomes redundant. When 
k is low there are too much labor to substitute scarce machine, and hence it lowers 
the contribution of labor. It results in a lower wage paid by fn- When k increases, 
the effect of zh becomes more and more dominant, and hence wh cuts wl from below, 
as shown in Figure 14. When a steady state occurs at k* — wl = wh, any growth of 
capital will only expand the share of firms using / " . It deters the equilibrium wage 
from growing. At this level of capital the effect of zh is recessive, so it pays less wage 
than autarky. Country L is worse off. 
(27) is crucial to determine the existence of poverty trap. Rewrite (27) and then 
the border line of poverty trap is given by 
A = 2C"-"， (29) 
where X < 1 is the smaller root solving S (X) = 0, which is given by 
= + a = 0. 
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So we have 
S' (X) dX + log Xda = 0. 
Since k is unstable, we have S' (20 < 0. Then 
dX _ log X 
da — S' (X) 
Therefore, differentiate (29) and we have 
dA= In X + - a) da. 
d(7 
negative 
So the border line of poverty trap is downward sloping in {a, A) parameter space. 
Region A in Figure 13 is the combination of (cr, A) above the border line. It means 
A > and so poverty trap does not exist. On the contrary, in region BA and 
BB {a, A) satisfies A < and poverty trap exists. The underlying dynamic of 
capital in region A is Figure 12，while the dynamic of region BA and BB are Figure 
11 and Figure 14 respectively. 
4.2 Open or Not? 
In this section I focus on the case that poverty trap exists, which is in region BA 
and BB of Figure 13. Of course it is meaningful to study strategy of development 
only if it is vulnerable to be enmeshed in poverty trap; otherwise market will take 
care of itself and converge to the rich. Recall k is the autarky steady state isolated 
from foreign production function fn. So k is the highest development level country 
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L can attain in absence of foreign technology. Therefore 
k > k^ ^k = Wl > wi = k*. 
Poverty trap is worse than autarky. Country L can actually attain higher devel-
opment level in autarky steady state. However, existence of poverty trap does not 
mean convergence to poverty trap. If the development level is high enough such that 
kt > k, then whenever is available, country L can nevertheless converge to the 
rich. So the timing of fn available becomes crucial to development. 
Denote {A;t}f=o,i,2... being the autarky development process according to kt+i = 
Wl {kt) ’ and limt—oo kt = k. Since {kt} is strictly increasing, so the concept of time 
and the development level is interchangeable. If k > k, there exists N such that for 
all t > N, kt > k. On the other hand, if k < k, then for all t, we have kt < fc, since 
{/ct} is a strictly increasing sequence. In the first case open to foreign production 
technology after time N guarantees a development path leading to /c; while in the 
second case it will lead to k*. It is advisable to keep isolated from foreign technology. 
So the timing to open depends on 
k < k. 




= < 三, 
k k 
A < 2 C ™ ， (30) 
< 2 r _ � 
where the last inequality implies (27) must hold given (30) is satisfied. So for any 
(cr, A), k < k implies existence of poverty trap. Therefore inequality (30) is binding 
and sufficient to conclusion. The border line of (30) is given by 
A = (31) 
dA = + da. 
^ V ^ 
negative 
So the border line is downward sloping in (o•，A) parameter space. Since it is binding, 
it is on the left of poverty trap border line. Below the border line (31), which is region 
BB of Figure 13，implies A < 左 — O p e n to foreign production technology at any 
time must lead to poverty trap eventually. On the other hand, in region BA, open 
to foreign production function after time N would lead to k. 
4.3 Optimal Timing to Foreign Production Function 
China and Japan provide an contrasting example to study the importance of timing 
to foreign production function (DeLong 1997[10] and Parente and Prescott 2000[19]). 
After western Industrial Revolution, both countries opened to foreign countries in 
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the late twentieth century. However the Meiji Restoration (1870s-1900s) was success-
fully implemented in Japan, while the Hundred Days Reform (1899) is proved to be 
totally failure and unsustainable in China. Bernhofen and Brown (2004[8], 2005[9]) 
and Romalis (2004(20]) have attributed the rise of Japan to comparative advantage 
and trade, but remaining its original technology. Our model provides an economic 
explanation why Japan adopted western technology. The vast population and the 
little commerce developed in the Qing Dynasty of China might result in low capital 
per labor. While historical data on capital per labor is scarce, their GDP in 1900 
may provide some reference. According to Maddison (2001 [17]), the GDP of China 
in 1900 was $652 while Japan $1,135. So even we neglect the political and cultural 
studies suggesting the potential difference in their adaptabilities to foreign technol-
ogy and take them the same, one can suggest hQf眾q = 652 < k< /c/=i9oo = 1135 to 
explain why industrialization, through adoption of foreign technology, happened first 
in Japan but not China. It is because when k〒上i说q = 652 and = 1135 it was 
costly, for Chinese to adopt foreign technology, while for Japanese it was worthy. 
So in China of 1900 only fraction of economy was involved in foreign technology. 
China was in poverty trap. However since there was sufficient capital in Japan then, 
adoption of foreign technology could support further evolution of capital, and fuelled 
the industrialization. Japan converged to the west. 
Follow the logic in previous section, it is advisable for China of 1900 to keep 
autarky until its development level was ready to foreign technology. The threshold 
of such level is k. However open to foreign at the time when k严皿 > k may not 
result the optimal development. Since it is possible that adopting domestic 九 yields 
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a faster growth of capital in short run than adopting foreign fn , then the optimal 
strategy should be enjoying the rapid growth under f i first, and then open to foreign 
and adopt The optimal timing to switch from Jl to f n becomes crucial to the 
speed of development. As the growth of capital in our framework is determined by 
wage, so the optimal time N* satisfies 
wl {kN*) = WH (/ctvO . 
/c/v* satisfies the above is equivalent to Xj^* satisfies N {X^*) = 0，which is defined 
as following 
N = A(l-a) Xn, - + 4 a 二 0’ （32) 
where 
XN* = V T ) . 
Since N (0) = Aa > Q and N (X = l) = A - I < vje have k^* < k. Also we have 
N' (X) = > l ( l - a ) - ( l - aa) r � 
which is increasing, then N' ( X ) = (1 - a) - (1 - ao") < 0 implies N' {X) < 0 for 
all k < kf^* < k. Since we already know 
N'�Xn*~) < 0 rules that wl (Jk) > wh {kt) when kt < kjsj*] and Wl (kt) < w^ (h) 
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when kt > k^*. Open too soon means for the kt=open < ^n* capital evolution would 
be along Wh (.)，however for any h二open < h < k^* we have w^ {kt) > wh (kt) and 
it is better to stay in autarky to evolve along wl (•)• On the other hand, if open too 
late there exist an interval kj^ * < h < kt=open such that wh (h) > Wl (h) and it is 
better to open to enjoy higher evolution along wh (•)• So at N* it is optimal timing 
of open to foreign. The following Proposition summarizes the optimal strategy of 
development. 
Proposition 3 Given (27) holds and poverty trap exists, then it is advisable for 
country L to 
1. Autarky, when (30) holds, which is region BB in Figure 13 
2. Open to foreign production function, at time N* which k^* satisfies (32)，when 
(30) does not hold, which is region BA in Figure 13. 
4.4 Discussion 
Having determined the steady states, I would study how the fundamental factors 
affect the steady state. Of course, if convergence to the rich happens, then the 
fundamental factor should have no marginal effect on steady state. So I first focus 
on the case of poverty trap. Then I study the cross region effect in the later text. 
Recall k* is the lower steady state, satisfies k* = wi (/cf) . By Theorem we have 
dk^ „ dk* dwi ,, , /, T-Na-i dkf" ^ 
So a higher cr reduces the steady state level of poverty trap. It is because firm starts 
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to adopt / / / at a lower k level. Recall 
� / \ l - a / \ 1-al 1 / (1 -… 
f r \ . . f w \ 
Ch = a — + (1 — Q! = • [ V h J \WhJ -
Figure 10 is the isocost diagram magnified at (ifi, ri), which is the cutting point of 
two bold line. The effect of a higher cr is exhibited by a more convex of isocost ch 
= 1 in Figure 10. So the resulted (tf；!,ri) would move in Southeast direction along 
cl = I. The isocosts cut at a lower Wi and country L stays in a lower trap level. 
There are twofold effects of zi on wi, one through Wi directly and another through 
/cf. By Theorem, both effects are positive and dwi/dzi is given by 
g 二（1 一 a )(对广 + azL (1 - a ) ( 时 广 g � 0 . 
Recall the isocost c^ = 1 
1 / r \ « r w 
CL = — ( - ] - — — = 1 -
Zl \a/ \1 - a J 
Graphically, the effect of a larger zl is shown as a outward shift of isocost cl = 1. 
The resulted (ii^i’ri) would move in Northwestern direction along ch = 1. These 
isocosts cut at a higher Wi and country L stays in a higher trap level. 
Similarly, the effect of zh is given by 
dzH dzH dzH Ml � ) i dzn 
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Not shown in Figure 10, but the effect of a larger Zh is a outward shift of isocost ch 
= 1 , results in a lower Wi and a lower trap level. 
Throughout the discussion above, I have taken the change in fundamental fac-
tors are localized. It means the change in fundamental factor are so small that the 
qualitative result would not change. Of course it is not the whole picture. The char-
acterization of localized effect provides a building block to study how fundamental 
factor can change the formation of poverty trap and its properties. 
Given the domestic productivity zl suppose there is an increase in o so that it 
passes through the border of region BB. In region BA a country opens from autarky 
must end up in poverty trap. Before passes through the border, it experiences a 
series fall in development level. It is because more fraction of firms engage in foreign 
production function and pull down the wage. So there is less saving by the old agent 
and result in less capital. However in region BA a country becomes possible to catch 
up. When foreign production technology becomes sufficiently adoptable, it can pay 
for a wage high enough to sustain further wage increase. The increase in wage pushes 
the capital level and the country converges to foreign capital level k. However the 
foundation of poverty trap is not eliminated; there are nevertheless two stable steady 
states. So a sufficiently large negative shock in capital can drive the country back to 
the poverty trap. If the increase in a is so large that it passes through the border of 
region BA further, then the country will experience a trap-eliminating bifurcation. In 
region A, the lower steady state disappears. It is because under any level of capital, 
the wage paid by firm adopting foreign production function is sufficient to sustain 
further capital evolution. Given any starting capital it will eventually converge to k. 
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So the economy becomes proof against any capital shock. According to this thought 
experience, a country experiences a decline first, and then a rapid development. 
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5 World Economy of Production Globalization 
Having characterized all the steady states of two countries model, we are now ready 
to study the effect of production globalization. The world economy is made up of 
a continuum of unit mass countries, which is different in productivity shock Zjgfo,!]. 
Denote [z,z] being the support of Zi and G {zi/z) : [z/z, 1] [0’ 1] being the cumu-
lative density of Zi/z. We also denote f whose productivity is z. The production 
globalization is a process which foreign technologies becomes free to be accessed by 
this continuum of unit mass countries. To fully control the effect of factor flow, 
capital and labor cannot move across countries. At the stage before production 
globalization, this is merely a collection of autarkey steady state satisfies 
ki = Wi {ki) = Zi{l- a) 
Once country i open to foreign, its firms are able to adopt the technology from their 
foreign counterpart. Firm's decision is based on comparison amongst the costs of 
each adopted production technology. 
So for firms in countries i, they are facing a continuum of production technology 
which is given by 
/ 
之j吟 if j = z 
fi i^i) = — a「 、 ¥ ， . 
where for j = i it is the domestic production function while for j ^ i it is the 
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adopted foreign production technology. Repeat the logic in the previous section, 
firms compare each unit cost under market wage and rate of return of capital. So 
define the unit cost difference function of production with domestic productivity Zi 
to foreign zj as 
Ci [Xj) = Aij (1 - a) Xj - X广 + 如， 
where 
/ \ 1—<7 
A.. - F ^ ] 
/ \ 1—O" 
( WOi \ 
Xj = = • 
Vr (1 - a) kj J 
Recall Ci {Xj) < 0 is equivalent to that the unit cost associated with Zj is less than 
so of Zi and so f j is adopted. Since the minimum of Ci (Xj) is 
Ci 阅 = � a ： (1 一 《 1 / " ) . 
One can immediately conclude that firms would not adopt the technology with 
smaller productivity, since the underlying Aij is greater than one and hence the 
entire Ci {Xj) lies above zero. So we have 
Ci (Xj ) > 0, if Zj < Zi. 
Therefore the reduced choice for the firm in country i are those foreign technology 
with Zj > Zi, as well as domestic production function. We then look at the unit cost 
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comparison between f j and / . Recall the unit cost of f j 
� / \ / � l - a l 1/(1-。） f r\ ,, ^ ( w\ a 二 + (1 - Q ； ) = , 
[ V j J K^jJ 
where fJ = a / (1 - a) and w] = kj. Since the highest kj is of 乏’ and every fi shares 
the same r], so we have 
Z < Cj, for Zi < Zj < 
where c is the unit cost associated with F. So c is less costly than any CJ. It means 
firms would adopt the technology with highest productivity given foreign technology 
are their consideration. Therefore the continuum choice of production function faced 
by firm in country i can be reduced to q and c only. Then the previous analysis of 
two countries model can be applied. 
Consider the parameter space (cr, zi/z). Then Figure 13 can be updated with 
zi/z on the vertical axis. Recall countries with parameter (cr, Zi/z) in the region 
BB converge to poverty trap. Under the border line by (31)，given adaptability cr, 
the range of zi/z of which countries converge to poverty trap is ^ which 
is a decreasing function in cr. So there is G (c*•广fraction of world economy 
enmeshed in poverty trap, with the steady state given by Wi in (??). 
On the other hand, countries with parameter (cr, zi/z) in the region BA converge 
to k although poverty trap exist. It is because the development levels of their autarky 
steady state are high enough to maintain the use of / . Given the border line by (29), 
under adaptability a, the range of Zi/z of which countries converge to poverty trap 
is (…—。，which is also a decreasing function in cr. Then there is G (友（o•广一")一 
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G [2L (o•广卯)fraction of world economy can escape from the poverty trap. Similarly, 
for the rest 1 — G (X ((J)�—�) fraction of world economy, with parameter (a, Zi/t) in 
the region A, their domestic productivity are already high enough and poverty trap 
does not arise. These countries converge to k. The following Theorem summarizes 
the above 
Theorem 2 Denote G being the cumulative distribution of productivity as a ratio of 
the leader country's. The production globalization results in three kind of development 
path from autarky: 
1. There is G fraction of world economy converges to poverty trap, 
countries with higher productivity Zi would result in higher steady state development 
level. 
2. There is G (X (fJ)"—*^) — G (X (o•广_��) fraction of world economy escapes 
from poverty trap, and the development level converges to the country with highest 
productivity 'z. 
3. There is I — G [X. (J广一fraction of world economy in absence of poverty 
trap. Their development level converges to the country with highest productivity z. 
Theorem predicts the existence of club convergence amongst the rich while di-
vergence amongst the poor. The size of the rich club is 1 - G [X_ ( c r广 " � ) . A n a l o g 
to two countries model, we can think of the world economy is a continuum of two 
countries model of which each countries is facing the same z, which replaces ZH. 
Club convergence takes place since firm of the countries in region A and BA would 
adopt the most advanced production function f at the steady state. However, in 
the trapped countries, only fraction of firms would adopt f and some of them are 
64 
stick to domestic production function. The model predicts the effect of production 
globalization is mixed. For those converge to poverty trap it is strictly worse off, 
as shown in comparative static studies. For those in the rich club, they are strictly-
better off by attaining a higher steady state. 
In the world economy, the impact of the country with highest productivity can 
affect other countries through the adoption of its technology. We can think of it is be-
ing the leader of research and technology that results in highest z. Any technological 
progress^^ happened in the leader country would exert a polarizing effect on entire 
distribution. A higher fraction of world economy would fall into the poverty trap. It 
is because the entire G {.) is shifted to the left, although the threshold X_ (<7)"—"" does 
not change . For those in the rich club, their steady state level increases according to 
the increase in the leader income level. Since we have dk*/dzn < 0, all the trapped 
countries suffer a decrease in income level. So we would observe a smaller but richer 
club altogether with a larger but poorer continuum of the trapped countries. 
ir'An stark prediction is no effect when negative productivity shock happened in leader country. 
Of course, if the distribution of Zi is continuous, then there must exists a second leader which 
productivity Zaec z so that for any negative shock happened the second leader would become 
the new leader. The difference in their productivity is infinitesimal and so no effect on the entire 
distribution. Alternatively, we can think of there is 1 — G 广 m e a s u r e of world economy 
have attained the development level of the leader's. Amongst these countries there are no effect 
as z decreases. For the firm in the rest of G (o•广。” measure of world economy the least 
costly foreign production is just the adopted production function associated with z used in 1 — 
G � � - � " ^ ) measure of the rich club. Of course we have taken the adopted production function 
of adopted production function is simply adopted production function itself. 
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5.1 Technological Progresses in Globalization Environment 
A technological progress in a poverty trapped country can be a improvement in 
its productivity or its adaptability. Results in Section 3.3 can be applied in this 
globalization framework. Since we have dwi/dzi > 0, the trapped countries with 
a higher Zi have a higher Wi, and hence a higher steady state capital level. On 
the other hand, we have dwi/da < 0, the trapped countries with a higher a would 
have a lower steady state capital level. The following proposition summarizes the 
comparative static result. 
Proposition 4 In the poverty trapped countries, either higher productivity or lower 
adaptability results in a higher steady state level. 
We can see the opposite effects of these two technological progress. Consider an 
improvement in domestic productivity, represented by the movement along ABC in 
Figure 13. Along AB there is a continuous improvement in the steady state income 
level. But along BC there is a discrete jump up to the income level of the rich club. 
It is because when it is slightly above B, the poverty trapped country can converge 
to k. 
Another possible technological improvement is represented by adaptability rise 
along A B ' C . Along AB，there is a continuous deterioration in the income level of the 
poverty trapped country. However, once the adaptability is greater than B', there 
is a discrete jump to a much higher income level of the rich club. The technological 
progress in adaptability features in a way that suffer first and enjoy later. 
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The effect of a also affects the world income distribution. For a higher a, there 
would be more countries can enter the rich club. However since we have dwi/da < 0， 
the trapped countries would be worsen from higher cr by a lower trapped level. It 
means a higher cr would polarize the development distribution. 
5.2 Discussion 
Having summarized the conditions of convergence and poverty trap on a and Zi, we 
then look into the possible factors affecting them, cr as adaptability measures how 
well domestic firm can make use of its idle labor when foreign technology is used. 
One may extend the model such that a is decreasing in the scale of foreign machine, 
for example we should expect maglev train is much more difficult to be adapted than 
rail train. If so, the technology leader may not always dominate the choice, while 
domestic production function nevertheless dominate over that of lower productivity. 
So for country i, the relevant production function are 
( 
^jK if j = i 
fi {ki) = <j — “ � d 1 点 ’ ’ 
Zjk/" a (每) +1-CV ifj = j(i\w\r') 
\ L J 
where the first is domestic production function and the second is the best foreign 
technology from country j r^). So we have 
j (i\w\r') = argmincj {w\r'\a{j))， 
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where uf and r^  are the prevailing factor price in country i. Under the autarky 
factor price, technology from country j (i) is the appropriate technology for country 
i. Since we already know that dcj/da < 0, the appropriate technology may not be 
the leader's. Adaptability is also taken into consideration. 
We have j {i) > i since technology with lower productivity is strictly dominated. 
If the technology of country j (i) is adopted, either country i will converge to the 
autarky steady state of country j (i) or the poverty trap. The qualitative result of 
the second possibility is the same as above. However, since country j (i), starting 
from its autarky steady state, may also converge to the autarky steady state of 
country ( i )三 j (j (i)) or the poverty trap, so do country i. Finally we have 
{i) tends to one for any i e [0,1). So there is nevertheless a fraction of world 
economy can converge to the leader's steady state and the rest is enmeshed in poverty 
trap. However in this extension the requirement of a such as to converge to the leader 
or no trap is reduced. So both the border lines will move to the left. 
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6 Conclusion 
The contribution of this thesis is to offer a new direction to account international 
income difference by providing a simple-to-extend model to study the effect of adapt-
ing foreign technology. In this thesis, I introduce a framework to study the impact 
of domestic firm adaptation to adopt foreign technology, which is more productive, 
on economic development. Foreign technology is adopted if it is less costly to pro-
duce than domestic technology. The measure of adaptability can be represented by 
the elasticity of substitution. My result predicts adoption takes place only when 
either adaptability or domestic capital is sufficiently high. Then poverty trap arises 
if domestic economy is trapped in a situation that some of its firms use domestic 
technology and some use foreign technology. It happens when either the domes-
tic productivity or the adoptability is sufficiently low. Finally I extend the model 
to production globalization where domestic firm can adopt a continuum of foreign 
technology. The model predicts a world income distribution segregates into a con-
vergence club of the same higher development level, and a continuum of poverty 
trapped countries with diverse income level. In the continuum, the income level is 
positively related to domestic productivity but negatively to adaptability. Autarky 
may be advisable to poor countries. To escape from poverty trap in the globalization 
framework, we advocate for improvement in domestic productivity. Improvement in 
adaptability to foreign technology results in income level deterioration, but suffi-




7.1 A l . Derivation of CES Technology from Cobb-Douglas 
Production Function 
This section provides another route to CES technology. We first start from Cobb-
Douglas production function, and then derive the CES technology. Cobb-Douglas 
production function is justified by its long appearance in literature. Besides take 
it for granted, Jones (2005[12]) provides an "idea stock" approach to derive Cobb-
Douglas production function. This section can be viewed as building on Jones's 
result. Jones starts with Leontief technology. Technology with 6/a-scaled machine 
is given by 
- J -
OJ 
where a and b are random variables with Pareto distribution. A pair of realized 
(a, b) is called an idea. There are P pairs of idea. Given (K^ N), firm chooses the 
idea leading to highest output level. When P tends to infinity, the collection of 
the optimal technologies tends to Cobb-Douglas. Jones also relieves the Leontief 
assumption. His simulations show that CES technology can lead to Cobb-Douglas 
as well. We extends the model such as to allow adaptation. So technology is CES 
characterized with adaptability parameter a, and (7 = 0 represents the Leontief case. 
Our logic works in the opposite direction. Given Jones's result of Cobb-Douglas 
production function, we are going to derive the underlying technology function if 
adaptation is allowed. 
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Given the capital and labor level, production function, denoted as F, is the 
collection of technologies, denoted as 严,with the highest output level. F is given 
by 
F{K,N) = maxF''{K,N\a) 
K 
So for each {K, N) there is a most efficient technology K (K, N) such that the output 
is the highest. So K [K, N) should be chosen such that there is no adaptation, hence 
K (/(，N) = K/N. Production function is reduced to 
F { K , N ) = F ' { K , N \ a ) , 
and as long as technology is homogeneous of degree one, the intensity form is given 
by 
赛 、 三 E l i ^ . 
Envelop theorem implies that 
dk dk ‘ 
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas form, which is given by 
刚 二 z k � ( 3 3 ) 
then the first derivative is given by 
实 = a z k “ . ( 3 4 ) 
dk 
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(33) and (34) give us some information about technology. When the capital intensity 
is ko, the output of technology ko is given by (33) and the first derivative of technology 
ko is given by (34). So we have 
f�(koH = zkS, 
dk 
Klump and de La Grandville (2000[15]) provide a normalization technique to give a 
CES solution to above problem. So given adaptability parameter cr, we rewrite our 
expression into their style 
k = ko, 
y = k , 
m = k. 
a 
Then Klump and de La Grandville show that the normalized CES is 
= z k — 1 —r, k a + 1 — — — 
\ " / L (X OL 
厂 ] ^ 
ya (k\ -
=zk a = 1 — a . 
72 
where 
_ _ _ 严 + 沉 、 点 
斗 M ’ 同 = � T T ^ J ’ 
_ _ _ 
a{G\k,y,m) = —• 
k + m 
QED. 
7.2 A2. Proof of Lemma 2 
For Lemma to be meaningful, we have to make sure that the condition of case 1 
and case 2 are not overlapping; that is Lemma is not self contradictory if and only 
/of < k^ and k^ < k^. It is proved by comparison with the value of w/r at k. 
Note that at k, w/r is the same regardless which production function is in use. 
That is 




- 三 ^ ^ 二 1 . 
Then 
C ( X ) = A - 1 < 0. 
So we have Xi < l C < X2 
/ \ 1—cr / \ 1—a 
= [ 華 < Y = I < X 2 二 . 
Vri (1 - a) kJ V^2(l - Oi)kJ 
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Then the first inequality implies 
/ \ l—a 
f 零 . ) < 1， 
V l (1 - OL�k) 
Wia -J- / wia \ 
ri (1 - a) < l i ( l - a ) " ， 
Second inequality implies 
/ \ l-a 
1 < f \ 
\r2 (1 - a ) k j ’ 
- ( w^oi \ —a W2a < 
\r2{l-a)kj 7-2(1 - a ) ’ 
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